Masterminding

Offensive Strategies

By Paul Richards,Manager, Chicago White Sox

Pages 34–37 · Phillips Petroleum Company, 1953

The lively ball has not eliminated strategy from the attack. Let’s consider some offensive strategic maneuvers not always obvious from a seat in the stands. Take the batter who fails to swing at the first pitch, even when it cuts the heart of the plate. He has been ordered to take this pitch by the manager, who relayed the sign to him through the first base or third base coach.

Why does the manager give such a sign? Because it would be poor baseball for every batter to swing at the first pitch early in the game. Early-game strategy aims to make the rival pitcher throw as many pitches as possible. The advantage is obvious, if it develops his control is not sharp. But even if his control is sharp, he may develop wildness as he tires from serving up a lot of pitches during the progress of the game. To further such strategy, some hitters who hit well even with two strikes on them, are often instructed to take a three-and-one pitch.

By making the pitcher pitch oftener, the batter frequently gains an advantage in the count. When a pitcher is behind in the count, his effectiveness is reduced. He usually gives the batter an easier ball to hit than he would if he was ahead in the count.

There are situations, of course, when a batter should not be ordered to take a pitch or wait out the pitcher. With runners in scoring position there is no percentage in handicapping the hitter with take signs, unless he is so notoriously weak with the bat that he is not liable to drive in any runs even if he hits the ball.

Nor should a batter be asked to take pitches when he is sent up to sacrifice. He should be free to pick out the pitch he can best bunt. This does not mean he should be instructed to bunt the first pitch. He should be ordered to bunt the first good pitch he sees. And he should be told not to hesitate to pass up a pitch that is high and (or) outside the strike zone.

The sacrifice still holds an important place in modern baseball. And I don’t mean only in obvious cases, such as with the score tied in the ninth and a runner on first with no outs.

Frequently, the manager is prompted to order a sacrifice not so much because of the situation as because of his personnel. For example, with a runner on first, a manager may order the batter to sacrifice because the batter who follows him has a tendency to hit into double plays. By moving the man on first to second with the sacrifice, the manager removes the double play situation.

There is also a time when a manager may disregard a sacrifice even though the situation seems to call for it. He knows that if the sacrifice is successful his next batter, who happens to be his best run-producer, will be given an intentional walk and thus denied the opportunity to drive in runs.

DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES

Most defensive strategy is planned in club house meetings. Pitchers are told how to work on the various batters. Infielders and outfielders are instructed how to shift positions against them. Position play depends in part on the type of pitcher. It is easier for the batter to pull the ball against some pitchers than others. For example, when a left-hander with a slow curve is pitching against a right-handed hitter, the third baseman should play closer to the foul line and the shortstop closer to the hole between short and third than they would with a fast ball pitcher on the mound. Few hitters are played straightaway. The infield plays a little deep for a batter who hits the ball hard but is slow getting down to first. And it plays a little shallow for the punch hitter who can run like a greyhound.

The strategical situation affects position play. For example, with a runner on first, the first baseman must hold him close to the bag. So the second baseman moves closer to first than usual, closing the gap between himself and the first baseman and protecting against ground balls hit there.

With a runner on second, the shortstop plays closer to the bag than usual, except if there’s a right-handed pull hitter at bat. Then he moves closer to third base than usual and the second baseman is responsible for holding the runner.

In shifting around to meet the strength of each hitter, it helps the fielder to know whether the pitcher is going to throw a fast ball or a curve. He gets this information by a system of signs. The sign is initiated by the catcher. Players not in position to see the catcher’s sign have it relayed to them by one of the infielders who is in position to see it — usually the shortstop or second baseman.

A special defense is employed against the toughest jam in baseball: a tie score in the last of the ninth, the bases full and nobody out. One run will end the game. The infield comes in on the grass. Each infielder knows that if he gets his hands on a ground ball there is only one place to throw it: to the plate.

The outfield also moves in much closer than usual; close enough so that if they catch a fly, they will have a good chance to throw out the runner at the plate. They are vulnerable, of course, to a long fly that they might catch from an orthodox defense. But catching a long fly would be useless in such a spot because the winning run would still come in from third after the catch. By packing the defense as described, the defensive team sometimes can get out of the hole.

With one out and runners on second and third, a manager usually will order the next hitter walked. His purpose is to set up a double play situation, if the pitcher is able to make the succeeding hitter knock the ball along the ground. The strategy, of course, is frustrated if the pitcher can’t do this. He tries by forcing the batter to hit a low breaking ball: a curve or a sinker.

A manager’s toughest strategical job is deciding when to remove his pitcher. Some pitchers start out well, then suddenly lose their stuff. Others start slowly but get stronger as the game goes along. A pitcher who stays ahead of the hitter in the count is a good gamble for the manager. But the manager gets ulcers from the pitcher who is constantly behind the hitter. Such a pitcher may get out of one hole after another, but usually the law of averages will eventually catch up with him. It is the manager’s trying job to determine how long Dame Fortune is going to smile.

Sometimes a manager lets a pitcher stay in and take a drubbing, and the fans think he has holes in his head. (And say so, loudly.) But he has his reasons. Often he is thinking of more than the game at hand. Maybe his pitching staff is badly overworked, and he has taken this day to give the other pitchers a rest and thus help the staff get straightened out. Or he may feel the pitcher who is being clubbed needs the competitive experience. (And, sometimes, the manager may even have made a mistake.)

So when you sit in the stands and try to figure out the strategy being employed by the team at bat, or when you see your favorite team in the field next time,

• WATCH movements of coaches. Some of them are signs.
• WATCH to see if batters wait out pitcher early in game.
• WATCH to see if batter hits 3-0, 3-1 pitch with runners on.
• WATCH how the defense shifts against various hitters.
• WATCH for low pitching with bases full, one out.